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Abstract 
The environment was David Cameron’s signature issue underpinning his modernisation agenda. In 
opposition the 'Vote Blue, Go Green' strategy had a positive impact on the party's image: the 
environment operated as a valence issue in a period of raised public concern, particularly about 
climate change,  and Cameron's high-profile support contributed to the cross-party consensus that 
delivered radical change in climate policy. Although the Coalition Government has implemented 
important environmental measures, the Conservatives have not enhanced their green credentials in 
government and Cameron has failed to provide strong leadership on the issue.  Since 2010, climate 
change has to some extent been transformed into a positional issue. Conservative MPs, urged on by 
the right-wing press, have adopted an increasingly partisan approach to climate change, and opinion 
polls reveal clear partisan divisions on climate change amongst public opinion. As a positional issue 
climate change has become challenging for the Conservatives, showing them to be internally 
divided, rebellious and inclined to support producer interests. This article makes a contribution to 
our understanding of Conservative modernisation, whilst also challenging the dominant assumption 
in the scholarly literature that the environment, particularly climate change, is a valence issue.  
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The environment was one of David Cameron’s signature issues underpinning his 
modernisation project for the Conservative Party. The selection of this ‘Vote Blue, Go Green’ 
strategy was underpinned by the widely-held assumption that the environment is a valence issue, 
characterized by a consensus across parties and the electorate about the need to protect the 
environment (Dunlap 1995; Johns et al 2009; Clarke et al 2011). Party competition over the 
environment would therefore be about performance: the perceived competence of the parties to 
deliver environmental protection policies. However, in this article we argue that although in 
opposition the environment did operate as a valence issue and contributed positively to the 
modernisation project, after the Conservatives entered government the impact of the green strategy 
was shaped - and often undermined - by the transformation of climate change into a positional 
issue, characterised by growing disagreement between political actors and the wider electorate over 
this issue.   
The 'Vote Blue, Go Green' strategy accrued some benefits in opposition because it was a 
time of relatively high public concern about the environment, particularly climate change. The initial 
green rhetoric and symbolic gestures were soon reinforced by policy substance. Indeed, Cameron’s 
support for progressive climate policy helped stimulate a cross-party ‘competitive consensus’ over 
the need for radical climate policy that contributed positively to the Labour Government introducing 
the path-breaking Climate Change Act 2008, followed by several policies first proposed by the 
Conservatives, including reforms to air passenger duties, smart meters and feed-in tariffs (Carter and 
Jacobs 2013). Subsequently, there was little difficulty agreeing a progressive environmental agenda 
with the Liberal Democrats for the coalition government that built on this legacy (Laws 2010). 
Several important environmental commitments were implemented. However, it soon transpired 
that environmental policies were an area of recurrent tension between the parties in the coalition 
and, significantly, a major source of discontent on the Conservative backbenches, particularly in the 
wider context of austerity and the need to prioritize economic growth. Gradually, the apparent 
consensus began to break down. Conservative backbenchers, urged on by the right-wing press, 
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adopted an increasingly partisan approach to climate change, and opinion polls revealed clear 
partisan divisions on climate change in the wider electorate. Consequently, with Cameron failing to 
provide political leadership on this divisive issue, the Conservatives have been unable to enhance 
their green credentials in office.  
This article challenges the dominant assumption in the electoral literature that the 
environment is a valence issue and makes a contribution to our understanding of Conservative 
modernisation. The next section outlines the role of the environment in the Conservative 
modernisation strategy in opposition, followed by an examination of its reception in the 
Conservative Party and the electorate. Attention then switches to the Coalition’s environmental 
programme and the problems the Conservative Party encountered in delivering it. The final sections 
assess the emergence of a partisan divide on climate change in the Conservative Party and the wider 
electorate.  The conclusion sets the findings in the wider context of Conservative modernisation and 
environmental politics.  
 
‘Vote Blue, Go Green’ 
David Cameron identified the environment as a central part of his strategy to transform the 
Conservative Party primarily because he saw it playing a tactical role within the wider modernisation 
strategy, with its objective of 'detoxification' or 'brand decontamination' (Carter 2009; Bale 2010). By 
prioritising the environment using language such as 'I think of a cleaner, greener world for our 
children to enjoy and inherit' (Cameron 2007, p.15), party strategists were hoping to expunge the 
image of the 'nasty party'. Cameron and other modernisers were careful to embed this rediscovery 
of environmental protection in traditional conservative values. In his 2007 Green Alliance essay he 
located his environmentalism firmly in Burkean concepts of stewardship - of responsibilities to past 
and future generations - themes that were still present in the 2010 Conservative Manifesto, which 
emphasized 'the inherent value of conserving things' and providing 'a good quality of life for future 
generations' (Conservative Party 2010, p.95).The selection  of the environment as a signature issue 
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represented a very visible break with the past: Conservative governments had a poor environmental 
reputation and none of his predecessors as party leader had made a concerted attempt to 
strengthen Conservative policy on this issue. Very little was said about the environment in previous 
Conservative manifestos and it received minimal attention in election campaigns (Carter 2006).  
Conservative strategists anticipated that the environmental message would accrue mostly 
indirect electoral benefits, by helping to alter the image of the Conservative Party, rather than by 
directly winning support from an environmental 'issue public'. But by strengthening the party's 
green credentials, the Conservatives might also become more attractive to Liberal Democrat voters. 
The Conservatives had generally trailed the other major British parties, particularly the Liberal 
Democrats, in embracing environmental concerns. Although the environment had low political 
salience amongst the overall electorate, polling evidence indicated that it had greater resonance 
amongst Liberal Democrat voters. An ICM poll in February 2006 found that Liberal Democrat 
supporters (37%) were more likely than Labour (32%) and Conservative supporters (24%) to think 
that taking action to address climate change should be a top government priority. A later YouGov 
poll, from December 2009, found that more Lib Dem supporters (31%) said environmental concerns 
were one of the three or four most important issues facing the country, compared to Labour (23%) 
and Conservative (10%) supporters. Cameron hoped that the green message would help persuade 
Liberal Democrat voters to transfer their allegiance to the 'new Conservative Party' (Bale 2010: 290). 
In addition, the Labour Government was looking increasingly vulnerable over its mediocre 
environmental record, with the Prime Minister in waiting, Gordon Brown, having shown little 
interest in promoting a green agenda as Chancellor (Carter 2008). 
It is important to note that the assumption underpinning all these points is that the 
environment is a valence issue: a consensus issue on which all voters and parties are agreed about 
the desired outcome (Stokes 1992). Consequently, where an issue is salient, party competition will 
be about performance - which party can best deliver that desired outcome.  
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Cameron was therefore keen to establish the new green credentials of the Conservative 
party. He frequently mentioned the environment during his leadership campaign in Autumn 2005 
and the opening months of his leadership saw several high-profile gestures. These included 
Cameron's trip to a Norwegian glacier to observe the effects of global warming at first hand; his 
weekly cycle to work; and the replacement of the Party's red, white and blue 'torch of freedom' logo 
with an oak tree, to symbolize solidity, tradition, friendliness towards the environment and 
'Britishness' (Browne  2006). This symbolism was reinforced by sustained rhetorical commitment. 
Cameron delivered several keynote speeches specifically on the environment and consistently 
included lengthy discussion of the issue in his more general speeches. A new statement of 
Conservative principles, Built to Last, published in August 2006, placed environmental protection 
third in the list of eight aims. Perhaps the most visible element of this new strategy was the decision 
to contest every local election campaign in opposition under the slogan Vote Blue, Go Green.  
Cameron backed this new green image with substantive policy proposals. He established a 
Quality of Life policy group, led by John Gummer and Zac Goldsmith, to help develop the Party's 
environmental programme. In September 2006 he shared a platform with Tony Juniper, Director of 
Friends of the Earth, to announce his support for FoE's 'Big Ask' campaign for a Climate Change Bill. 
Meanwhile George Osborne, the Shadow Chancellor, promised that a Conservative Government 
would increase the share of taxation raised by environmental taxes.  
Not surprisingly, this level of proselytising about the environment was not sustained. 
Cameron devoted less attention to the environment after Gordon Brown became Prime Minister in 
June 2007. The immediate catalyst was the need to shore up Conservative support to deter Brown 
from calling a snap election that Autumn, which prompted a shift back to a familiar Conservative 
agenda of crime, traditional family values and immigration. Subsequently, Cameron seemed more 
reluctant to discuss the environment in his speeches and he omitted it from a May 2008 press 
conference spelling out the priorities for a future Conservative Government. Yet a series of policy 
initiatives, including green technology start-ups, a Green Deal on energy efficiency, smart meters 
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and feed-in tariffs, indicated it had not been forgotten. Significantly, Cameron took strong pro-
environment stances on two high profile issues. He opposed the construction of a third runway at 
Heathrow Airport, promising to overturn the Labour Government's authorisation of the project, and 
the application by the energy utility, E.ON, to build Britain's first new coal-fired power station in 
three decades at Kingsnorth, Kent (Carter and Jacobs 2013). Cameron was again demonstrating how 
far the Party had changed by deliberately positioning himself alongside the green lobby in opposition 
to the pro-business interests that, historically, the Conservative party would be expected to support. 
One former Labour Government advisor observed that the environmental NGOs, 'almost had carte 
blanche to persuade the Tories to adopt pro-climate policies' to maintain the Party's green image 
and keep up the pressure on Labour (personal communication, July 2010). Accordingly, the 2010 
Conservative Manifesto contained a larger and more progressive environmental section than its 
predecessors (Rootes and Carter 2010, p.993-4). 
 
The Environment and Conservative Modernisation in Opposition 
It is very hard to evaluate the impact of the ‘Vote Blue, Go Green’ strategy because it is impossible to 
isolate the impact of the environment within the modernisation strategy. Several commentators 
have suggested, tentatively, that the modernisation did deliver some benefits, particularly for 
Cameron, less so for the Conservative Party (Bale 2010, Bale and Webb 2010, Kavanagh and Cowley 
2010). This section examines the reception of the environment’s central role in the modernisation 
project when in opposition, focusing on the Conservative Party and the electorate.  
The Conservative Party 
When Cameron and his advisors identified the environment as a core element of the modernisation 
strategy they probably anticipated that the wider party would be reasonably receptive to the green 
message. After all, as a valence issue, even if members didn’t regard the environment as a priority, 
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they were unlikely to oppose the strategy. Cameron and other modernizers missed no opportunity 
to remind his audience that ideas such as ‘conservation’ and 'stewardship' were core Conservative 
values (Cameron 2007). Similarly, two members of the Conservative Environmental Network argued 
that Cameron’s focus on the environment was not a conversion but, rather, a ‘homecoming’, and 
that ‘The Tories have a long and proud history of environmental preservation’ (Caldecott and Dick 
2010).  
Initially, many party members were prepared to see where the leader’s green path would 
lead, albeit large sections of the party appeared to be unconvinced by what was sometimes 
disparagingly referred to as the outbreak of ‘bunny-hugging’ (Bale 2008) within the leadership. 
Disgruntled party activists used the growing range of political blogs to vent their feelings, and 
negative stories were frequently picked up in the right-wing press. Osborne’s declaration that a 
Conservative Government would increase green taxes, albeit with no rise in the overall tax burden, 
provoked widespread anger on the backbenches. When the Quality of Life Policy Group reported in 
September 2007, in the middle of the phoney election campaign, the mood had shifted. The launch 
of the report was a fiasco (former Conservative advisor, personal interview, September 2014) and it 
was widely criticized by Conservative MPs and the right-wing press. This discontent prompted the 
leadership to issue an immediate public rejection of two controversial proposals for new green taxes 
on supermarket parking and on short flights - and the document was quickly shelved. After the onset 
of the financial and economic crisis in Autumn 2008 helped solidify opposition to green taxes (on the 
grounds that it would reduce the competitiveness of British business), the Shadow Chancellor quietly 
dropped the idea and there was no mention of green taxes in the 2010 Conservative manifesto.  
Climate change proved particularly divisive. Cameron identified it as the most important 
contemporary environmental challenge and focused his efforts on it. Yet a significant number of 
Conservative MPs remained sceptical about climate change: a ComRes survey found that one third 
of Conservative MPs still questioned its existence and its link to human activity (Adam 2008). Despite 
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Cameron’s strong support for a Climate Change Bill, three Conservative MPs voted against it on the 
third reading in 2008, and many abstained. Significantly, party managers set a low priority one-line 
whip in order not to provoke a backbench rebellion that would have highlighted divisions in the 
party. In the run up to the 2009 Copenhagen summit, especially after the ‘Climategate’ affair, 
Conservative sceptics became increasingly vocal. Senior Conservatives, including David Davis, Ann 
Widdecombe and Peter Lilley, expressed their doubts in newspaper articles and interviews. By the 
2010 general election it was clear that although Cameron's claim that a strong commitment to the 
environment was core to Tory values met little outright opposition, it had not been fully embraced 
by the wider party, particularly with regards to climate change.  
 
The Electorate 
Another reason why Cameron stopped talking as much about the environment, particularly as the 
general election approached, was that there was limited evidence that his enthusiasm for the issue 
was securing electoral benefit. Cameron's green strategy does seem to have bolstered his party's 
image on the issue: before he become leader the public regarded the Conservatives as relatively 
weak on environmental issues, but by March 2010 none of three major parties was seen as 
significantly better than any other (ICM March 2010). But the Conservatives were still no better than 
neck-and-neck with the other major parties in a contest - that included the Green Party - for a 
diminishing environmental issue public. Moreover, private Conservative polling indicated that his 
green message was not popular with core supporters, and focus groups criticized Cameron for 'just 
going on about the environment all the time' (Environmental non-governmental organisation 
(ENGO) lobbyist, personal communication, February 2010).  
It is clear that Conservative (and Labour) strategists calculated that the environment 
promised limited direct electoral benefits, so the issue returned to its normal peripheral role during 
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the election campaign. Data from the BES 2010 post-election survey show that tiny proportions of 
those voting for three main parties rated the environment as the most important issue facing the 
country at the present time: highest at just 2.0% for Liberal Democrat supporters.1 More broadly, 
Cameron's modernisation strategy, with the environment at its core, was adopted and developed 
when public concern about the environment was at its zenith, with around a tenth of the public 
perceiving it to be one of the most important issues facing the country (see Figure 1), particularly in 
the period surrounding the publication of the Stern Report on climate change in 2006 (Stern 2006). 
In May 2010 the proportion perceiving this was 4-5%, which arguably weakened its potential 
effectiveness in convincing the wider public that the party’s image had changed as it entered office. 
Overall, it appears that while the environment generally functioned as a valence issue during 
this period, and as part of the wider modernisation strategy it probably had some benefits for 
Cameron and the Conservative Party, the germs of future division over climate change were already 
visible. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The Environment and Conservative Modernisation in Office 
If the environment played a significant role in the modernisation strategy whilst the Conservatives 
were in opposition, it failed to do so after the party entered government in May 2010. Cameron may 
have identified the formation of the Coalition Government not merely as a device to secure office 
but also as a means of continuing the modernisation project. The implementation of a progressive 
and wide-ranging coalition environmental programme would have allowed Cameron to demonstrate 
the Conservative Party's commitment to the issue, and provided him with a strong basis to resist the 
discontent on the backbenches and beyond. However, this aspiration foundered in large part 
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because of growing partisanship over environmental issues, especially climate change, in the 
Conservative Party and the electorate. 
 
The Greenest Government Ever? 
There was little difficulty agreeing a progressive environmental agenda with the Liberal Democrats 
for the Coalition Government (Laws 2010). The Coalition: Our Programme for Government promised 
to 'implement a full programme of measures to fulfil our joint ambitions for a low carbon and 
ecofriendly economy' (HM Government 2010). Indeed, Cameron was famously bold enough to 
promise to be the ‘greenest government ever' (Randerson 2010). In practice, given the degree of 
pre-election cross-party consensus, the climate and energy policy commitments largely echoed 
those of the outgoing Labour Government, with the focus shifting from policy design to the 
implementation of the low carbon strategy. The one significant area of difference within the 
Coalition was over nuclear power, with the Liberal Democrats forced to drop their outright 
opposition to the construction of new reactors. However, they secured a commitment that new 
reactors would receive no public subsidy and their MPs would be allowed to abstain in any 
parliamentary vote on the issue. 
Since 2010 several important environmental policies have been implemented, including 
most of the key commitments in the Coalition Agreement. Crucially, the Government accepted the 
4th carbon budget, which reaffirmed the commitment to the ambitious carbon emission targets set 
out in the Climate Change Act. Other notable policies included the establishment of a Green 
Investment Bank, the Green Deal to encourage household energy efficiency, a minimum floor price 
for carbon, the roll-out of 53 million smart meters by 2019 and turning down the proposal for a third 
runway at Heathrow Airport. The wide ranging Energy Act 2013 seeks to drive billions of pounds of 
investment into low carbon electricity generation and ensure security of supply. 
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Yet the Conservatives have received few plaudits for their environmental policies; on the 
contrary, the promise to be 'the greenest government ever' has become the target for criticism - and 
ridicule - in the media, the green business community and ENGOs (e.g. Porritt 2011, Green Alliance 
2013). If Cameron's aim was to demonstrate that he was leading a modernized Conservative Party 
which, building on the work in opposition, had established its green image in office, then he seems 
to have failed. 
 
Problems in Delivering the Coalition's Environmental Commitments 
Although most of the environmental policies in the 'Programme for Government' were eventually 
implemented, the manner in which several were either agreed or delivered did little to enhance the 
Conservative Party's environmental image.  
Arguably the most important environmental decision taken by the Government was its 
acceptance in May 2011 of the recommendation by the independent Committee on Climate Change 
for a 4th carbon budget designed to keep the UK on track to meet its emission reduction targets up 
to 2027. However, with several cabinet ministers pushing for weaker targets, the Chancellor insisted 
that the Liberal Democrat Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Chris Huhne, accept a 
compromise that the carbon budget be reviewed in 2014 in case the UK was found to be moving 
faster to reduce emissions than the rest of the EU. Thus, even though Cameron stepped in to resolve 
the row, thereby ensuring that Huhne could announce a pace-setting 2025 reduction target of 50%, 
the positive green message was distorted by the media coverage of the Cabinet row.   
Similarly, the Green Investment Bank was launched with £3 billion support from the 
Treasury to leverage private sector capital to fund projects in renewable energy, waste and energy 
efficiency, that would boost the green economy. However, despite delivering on its promise to set it 
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up, the Chancellor's refusal to allow it to borrow money until 2015 - and then only if the national 
debt is falling - again attracted considerable negative coverage.   
The Conservative's flagship manifesto policy to improve energy efficiency, the Green Deal, 
has attracted extensive criticism. The Green Deal replaced the previous policy of using a public 
subsidy in the form of an obligation on energy utilities to supply energy saving measures funded by 
domestic energy bills. Instead, the Green Deal provides householders with a privately financed loan 
fixed to the building and repaid through energy bills. Unfortunately, at the Treasury's insistence 
these loans are at an unattractive commercial rate. Perhaps more importantly, the financial and 
non-financial barriers to householders embracing energy efficiency measures have been 
underestimated. Consequently, the press reported with glee figures suggesting that, eight months 
after its introduction, only four people had signed up to it (Gray 2013). By the end of 2013, 1,030 
households had been recruited, compared to the target of 10,000. However, over 117,000 green 
deal assessments had been made, leading the Climate Change Minister, Greg Barker, to speculate 
that people were seeking expert advice on what measures were needed, but then choosing to 
finance them without signing up to the Green Deal loan scheme (Hansard, 16 January 2014, column 
975). Either way, the Green Deal was widely regarded as a policy failure. 
The green image of the Conservatives has also suffered from policy measures that were 
widely regarded as damaging to the natural environment. Almost immediately the Government 
seemed perversely keen to undermine its 'greenest government ever' boast. In 2010, as part of the 
wide-ranging 'cull of quangos', the Government disbanded the Sustainable Development 
Commission (SDC) and the Royal Commission for Environmental Pollution (RCEP), thereby removing 
two of its main sources of independent advice on environmental issues. Whilst the SDC, formed by 
the Labour Government in June 2001, had struggled to carve out a clear role for itself, the RCEP was 
a long-established and well-respected independent body. The closure of both organisations 
prompted criticism from opposition parties and considerable dismay in environmental circles 
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(Vaughan 2010). Significant funding cuts were also announced for the Environment Agency and 
Natural England, as part of the broader deficit reduction agenda. 
In Autumn 2010 the Secretary of State for the Environment, Caroline Spelman, announced 
plans to privatize around 15% of the national forestry estate. This proposal provoked huge criticism 
across the political spectrum. A campaign group, 38 Degrees, published a petition against the sell-off 
that quickly attracted over half a million signatories. A YouGov poll found that 75% of respondents 
opposed the sale and just 6% supported it, with large majorities against it amongst supporters of all 
the main parties (YouGov 13-17 January 2011). Discontent on the backbenches saw a handful of 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPs vote against the government in a forestry debate. 
Consequently, having opened a national consultation on the plans in January 2011, Spelman soon 
terminated the consultation and announced she was withdrawing the proposals, admitting in the 
House of Commons that the government had 'got this one wrong' (BBC News 17 February 2011). 
Subsequently, several controversial policies generated negative environmental headlines. 
First, the Government's commitment to the construction of HS2, initially from London to the 
Midlands, generated considerable hostility from local residents’ groups and ENGOs, concerned in 
part by the damage it will cause to precious habitats. The route passes through several rural 
Conservative constituencies, which has prompted opposition to the scheme from Conservative 
backbenchers. In April 2014, 34 Conservative MPs rebelled against the government’s HS2 policy 
during the second reading stage in the House of Commons (BBC News 29 April 2014). Surveys 
conducted by YouGov from 2012-2014 show that that while overall negative sentiment has 
fluctuated, opposition has generally been higher amongst Labour supporters than Conservatives, 
with large majorities of UKIP supporters consistently against HS2. Overall, by generating vocal and 
sustained opposition on the Conservative back-benches, HS2 has done little to strengthen the 
Conservative's green image. 
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Second, DEFRA's decision to carry out a cull of badgers in an attempt to control the 
transmission of tuberculosis amongst cattle has been a policy disaster that, in the eyes of 
environmentalists and animal rights campaigners, has placed the Government firmly on the side of 
farmers. The Government has faced a genuine dilemma: TB is a major problem for the livestock 
farming industry that is driving many farmers to bankruptcy (or close to it), but the badger is a 
popular and iconic creature. Yet the Government's response has been extraordinarily incompetent. 
It has ignored clear scientific advice from leading animal disease experts, drawn from its own pilot 
study, that culling could worsen rather than improve the spread of TB by encouraging infected 
badgers to move further afield (Carrington and Doward 2012). Initially delayed by problems in 
counting the badger population, the cull in Somerset and Gloucestershire commenced in 2013, but 
the marksmen failed to shoot anywhere near the required targets of 70% of the badger population 
despite an extension to the cull. When the Government's own independent panel of scientific 
experts found that the cull was neither effective nor humane - and also very expensive (DEFRA, 3 
April 2014) - another embarrassing climb-down followed. Plans to extend the cull nationwide were 
dropped - although the pilot culls would continue in Somerset and Gloucestershire for three more 
years - to be replaced by vaccination projects around the edge of the most badly affected zones. 
YouGov polling has shown that a plurality of the public oppose the cull. It was another high-profile 
policy that had a negative effect on the green image of the Conservative Party. 
Third, the Chancellor and the Prime Minister have both declared their strong support for 
exploiting the extensive deposits of shale gas underneath large parts of mainland Britain. 
Proponents of fracking argue that it will bring energy security, jobs and, possibly, cheaper bills. Shale 
gas also emits fewer greenhouse gases than coal, so it may help the UK to meet its emission 
reduction targets. Opponents point to a range of environmental harms, notably damage to the 
water aquifers, despoilment of the countryside, earthquakes and an influx of heavy lorries 
transporting water, sand and drilling equipment. By attracting the majority of available energy 
investment, fracking may also lock the UK into a fossil fuels trajectory by reducing investment in 
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renewable energy, just when that nascent sector is becoming established. Osborne announced 
generous tax breaks to encourage shale gas development and, fully aware that fracking may be 
locally unpopular, financial incentives to the affected communities. Fracking has received extensive 
criticism. An attempt to drill exploratory wells in Balcombe, Sussex, attracted high profile celebrity 
protesters, leading to the arrest of Green MP, Caroline Lucas. Such protests are likely to become 
common place as the momentum behind fracking increases. Meanwhile, in January 2015 the 
Environmental Audit Committee called for a moratorium on all fracking on the grounds that it could 
derail efforts to mitigate climate change and, to ward off a rebellion by Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat MPs over a clause in the Infrastructure Bill, the Government accepted a Labour 
amendment imposing a new set of conditions preventing fracking in a many areas, including 
National Parks and Sites of Special Scientific Interest (BBC News 27 January 2015).  
Thus, despite heading a coalition government responsible for several progressive 
environmental measures, the Conservative Party has struggled to establish its own green 
credentials. One factor has been a lack of prime ministerial leadership. Many of the problems 
identified above, particularly the often visible arguments within Cabinet, could have been dealt with 
by decisive interventions from the Prime Minister, as eventually happened in the case of the 4th 
carbon budget. However, having championed the environment, and especially climate change, in 
opposition, Cameron was strangely silent on the issue once in power; for example, by January 2015 
he had not yet delivered a keynote speech on the environment or climate change.2 Cameron has 
appeared inconsistent on the environment: sometimes identifying climate change as a government 
priority and lauding the Government’s green achievements; at other times appointing an opponent 
of wind farms (John Hayes) as junior energy minister and reportedly demanding that officials ‘get rid 
of all the green crap’ (green levies and regulations) that he regarded as responsible for pushing up 
energy prices (Sparrow 2013). In particular, Cameron seemed reluctant to challenge 'the growth of 
climate science denial in his own party' (Green Alliance 2013, p.10).  
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Conservative Party Partisanship on Climate Change  
In this section we argue that the Conservative Party, urged on by the right-wing press, has adopted 
an increasingly partisan approach to climate change. Despite the clear policy impact of the 'Cameron 
effect' while in opposition, Cameron never succeeded in persuading the parliamentary party that the 
environment, especially climate change, should be a priority issue. Most Conservative MPs were 
prepared to lie low in the hope that Cameron would deliver a majority Conservative Government in 
2010; but when he failed to do so and had to join forces with the traditionally ‘green’ Liberal 
Democrats, vocal opposition became more widespread. This opposition was motivated by two 
distinct, albeit overlapping, concerns: pragmatism and ideology. 
Pragmatism was driven by the economic priorities of the coalition government, which was 
committed to austerity and deficit reduction. In such circumstances climate change and the 
environment were always likely to receive lower priority than economic concerns. From this 
perspective any environmental measures that involved significant public expenditure or potentially 
made the UK less competitive than its trading rivals would be resisted. Not surprisingly, the 
Chancellor himself quickly became the leading exponent of this view when he declared at the 
Conservative Party conference in September 2011 that ‘We’re not going to save the planet by 
putting our country out of business. So let’s, at the very least, resolve that we’re going to cut our 
carbon emissions no slower but also no faster than our fellow countries in Europe. That is what I've 
insisted on in the recent carbon budget’ (Osborne 2011). Osborne was clearly unconvinced by green 
growth arguments and, in various inter-departmental disputes, he lobbied hard against key 
measures. Thus he resisted pressure to allow the Green Investment Bank to borrow before 2015. He 
also blocked the inclusion of a 2030 decarbonisation target in the Energy Bill, despite it being 
recommended by the Climate Change Committee and supported by the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Energy and Climate Change, MPs from all parties and many business leaders. This 
decision prompted an active campaign by a coalition of major ENGOs to secure an amendment to 
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the Bill - proposed by Conservative Tim Yeo - that would insert a decarbonisation target. Eventually, 
this amendment was narrowly defeated in the Commons and the Lords in June 2013 (Harvey 2013).  
The second factor is ideology. The Conservative right has developed a deep partisan hostility 
to climate policy by framing it ‘variously as a “green tax”, as “subsidies”, as an unwarranted 
intervention by the state, and sometimes as associated with Europe – all frames which connect with 
wider Conservative political values’ (Lockwood 2013, p.1344). At the extreme end of this position is a 
core group of climate sceptic MPs. One (admittedly small) survey of MPs found that 18% of 
Conservative MPs (10/57) agreed with the statement that 'Manmade climate change is 
environmental propaganda for which there is little or no real evidence', while 53% (30/57) 
acknowledged that 'there is a widespread theory that climate change is largely manmade but this 
has not yet been conclusively proved' (Populus 10 September 2014). It seems likely that the Global 
Warming Policy Foundation (GWPF), a right-wing think-tank, has played an important role in 
promoting climate scepticism in right-wing circles. Beyond the hard core climate sceptics there is a 
larger group of 'climate go-slowers', who may not be outright sceptics but regard action on climate 
change mitigation as a low priority issue, especially in times of austerity. 
As the opponents grew in number and volume, they became more confident, especially after 
Osborne’s 2011 conference speech. They were also encouraged by the decision to allocate the 
cabinet position at DECC to the Liberal Democrats. Chris Huhne was a powerful advocate for the 
climate portfolio, a Liberal Democrat protagonist in inter-party disputes in cabinet and someone 
who reportedly had a 'spiky' relationship with George Osborne (Chorley  2012). Consequently, 
Conservative dissidents probably felt less constrained criticising climate and energy policies as they 
could direct their anger at a political opponent (albeit a coalition partner).   
Discontent towards Coalition climate policy among Conservative backbenchers coalesced in 
increasingly vitriolic opposition to onshore wind farms, which became a symbol of the perceived 
malign influence of the environmental lobby. This almost visceral hatred of wind turbines has been 
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fanned enthusiastically by sections of the right-wing press. An early indication of potential trouble 
on the backbenches was a candidate survey prior to the 2010 general election, which found that 
54% of Conservative Party prospective parliamentary candidates (n=76) disagreed with the 
statement that ‘Expansion of onshore wind is essential if the UK is to deliver on its renewable energy 
targets’ (ComRes 2010). By February 2012, concern was sufficiently high to prompt 101 Conservative 
MPs (several of whom were mainstream loyalists) to sign a letter to the Prime Minister urging him to 
remove or 'dramatically cut' the subsidies paid to wind farm developers (Hennessey 2012). Although 
Cameron initially responded with a letter setting out his support for wind farms, such was the 
growing political pressure on him that in the summer 2012 ministerial reshuffle he appointed an 
opponent of wind power, John Hayes, as junior energy minister and another, Owen Paterson, as 
Secretary of State at DEFRA. The appointment of Hayes rather backfired when, in an interview he 
complained that the country was 'peppered' with onshore wind farms, that 'enough is enough' and 
stated that 'we can no longer have wind turbines imposed on communities' (Winnett 2012). After 
Nick Clegg blocked a proposal from Cameron and Osborne to place a cap on the construction of 
onshore wind farms, it was reported that Cameron was considering including a promise in the next 
Conservative election manifesto to curb further construction of onshore wind turbines (Mason 
2014).  
Subsequently, when domestic energy prices became politically contentious in 2013, the 
criticism of wind power expanded to a broader assault on the 'onerous' green levies that contributed 
to increased consumer prices. The Coalition Government, facing criticism from both the right and 
the left - in the form of Ed Miliband's promise of a price freeze on energy prices - scrapped 
environmental levies amounting to £50 a year per household, providing the cuts are passed on by 
the energy utilities (although this effectively represented a shift from individual consumers to 
general taxation).  
Significantly, there has been no sustained attempt by Conservatives sympathetic to the 
green agenda to resist the growth of this critical discourse or to offer an alternative centre-right, 
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pro-green growth discourse that is positive about action to prevent climate change. One short-lived 
initiative saw 12 'Turquoise Tories', including several MPs from the new 2010 intake, meet the Prime 
Minister to urge him to stem the anti-wind and anti-climate change rhetoric from Conservative 
ministers (Merrick, 2012). Perhaps it is significant that of the three Conservative MPs (all 2010 
intake) who contributed to a Green Alliance (2013) booklet, 'Green Conservatism’, two (Laura 
Sandys and Dan Byles) stood down at the 2015 election. It seems that the environment - particularly 
climate change - has real flaws as a core Conservative issue upon which to build a modern party. The 
right is climate sceptic or 'climate go-slow' because it is anti-regulation, pro-market, anti-state, anti-
EU, anti-taxes, so it is very hard to construct a 'conversation' or 'narrative' where positive action to 
mitigate climate change fits comfortably. Indeed, following his sacking from the Cabinet in July 2014, 
Owen Paterson launched a vitriolic campaign against the 'powerful, self-serving' environmental 
lobby, which he dismissed as the 'Green Blob', and in a speech to the GWPF he called for the repeal 
of the Climate Change Act (Mail, 15 October 2014). 
To summarize, since 2010 climate change has become an increasingly partisan issue within 
the Conservative Party and the right-wing press.  While only a small group of Conservative MPs are 
outright climate change deniers, a much wider group of MPs has been willing to embrace a critical 
discourse on climate policy, for a combination of ideological and pragmatic reasons. 
 
Party Supporters’ Attitudes towards Climate Change and Wind Farms 
This section examines the opinions of party supporters on green issues and shows the existence of a 
partisan divide in public attitudes towards climate change and wind farms. Existing research has 
shown that Conservative supporters and people holding right-wing ideological beliefs tend to exhibit 
more sceptical views about, and show less concern for, climate change in particular (Clements 2012; 
Humphrey and Scott; 2012; Whitmarsh 2011; Taylor 2011) and environmental issues in general 
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(Clements 2014). Liberal Democrats, as befits their party’s traditional green credentials, tend to be 
more pro-environmental in their attitudes and behaviours (Clements 2014). 
YouGov surveys provide an extensive set of data on climate change, most of which has been 
collected during the period of the coalition government.3 Table 1 presents the results from a 
question on whether climate change is occurring and whether human activity is the cause, with data 
available for 2008-2014. Alongside the views of Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat 
supporters, data for UKIP supporters are available for the more recent surveys. It is clear that 
Conservative and UKIP supporters are generally more likely to believe that climate change is not 
occurring or, if it is, that it is not caused by human activity. Scepticism on the part of UKIP supporters 
is generally higher than that registered by Conservative supporters. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 2 reports surveys conducted in 2013-2014 showing that when asked whether the 
effects of climate change are exaggerated, again, Conservative and UKIP supporters are much more 
likely than Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters to offer more sceptical responses, believing that 
the effects are overplayed (a majority in each case for UKIP supporters, and over two-fifths for 
Conservative supporters). 
A more recent ComRes (2015) survey from January-February 2015 shows 
a similar patterning of attitudes for party supporters, this time in relation to concern for climate 
change. Conservative (54%) and UKIP (51%) supporters are much less likely to be very or fairly 
concerned about climate change compared to Labour (71%), Liberal Democrat (77%) and other party 
supporters (78%). Nearly half of Conservative and UKIP supporters said they were not very or not at 
all concerned about climate change compared to around a quarter of Labour supporters and a fifth 
 
of Liberal Democrat and other party supporters (ComRes 2015). 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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The previous section discussed the widespread opposition amongst Conservative MPs and 
the right wing press to wind turbines. Table 3 reports YouGov data for two questions asking about 
the government’s usage or encouragement of wind power, again showing party supporters’ 
attitudes. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Conservative supporters are less favourable towards wind power compared to Labour and 
Liberal Democrat supporters. Generally, strong majorities of Labour and Liberal Democrat 
supporters are in favour of government backing for wind power, reaching around three-quarters of 
the latter in some surveys. Where separate data for UKIP supporters are available, they hold views 
similar to those expressed by Conservative supporters. Another YouGov survey, from July 2012, 
asked several questions about wind power and, across-the-board, Conservative supporters were less 
likely to give positive assessments that the other main party supporters. Conservatives were: 1) less 
likely to think wind turbines could make a positive contribution to the reduction of CO2 emissions 
and that wind was a viable source of green energy; and 2) more likely to think the government was 
over-subsidising wind power and to believe that the negative impacts of wind farms (their 
appearance and noise pollution) outweighed their positive contribution to the generation of green 
energy. An April 2014 YouGov survey also found lower support for onshore wind power among 
Conservative and UKIP supporters with, respectively, 55% and 48% in favour, compared to 69% of 
Labour supporters and 77% of Lib Dem supporters. Overall, Conservative and UKIP supporters are 
less likely to favour government support for wind energy, are more sceptical about its efficacy as a 
source of green energy and more likely to regard turbines as a blot on their ‘green and pleasant’ 
landscape. 
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Our data does not show that the partisan divide has definitely increased since 2010, because 
there is insufficient systematic data available pre-election, particularly before 2008, to be able to 
draw any robust comparisons over time. However, it is does seem reasonable to conclude that 
Cameron was influenced by the pressures and dissent from within his own parliamentary party, 
egged on by the right wing press, and underpinned by a more sceptical Conservative-supporting 
base. 
 
Conclusion 
It is not clear whether David Cameron's rash promise to be the 'greenest government ever' 
represented a serious intention to restore the environment to the forefront of the modernisation 
project or was simply a rash moment of bravado, which has repeatedly come back to haunt him. 
Either way, rather than demonstrating how far the Party has changed, the environment has shown 
the Conservatives to be somewhat internally divided and rebellious (as well as bickering with their 
Liberal Democrat coalition partners), and inclined to support producer interests (oil and gas 
companies, energy utilities, farmers) rather than environmentalists.  
If Cameron did initially hope that the environment could play a positive modernising role, he 
seems to have been quickly disabused of that notion. After stepping in to broker a deal with Osborne 
and Huhne to enable the Government to accept the 4th carbon budget (a climb-down would have 
been politically damaging given his support for the Climate Change Act in opposition), Cameron 
effectively relinquished any leadership role in a policy area that was formerly one of his signature 
issues. He has offered no public encouragement to an alternative centre-right green growth 
discourse that might challenge the Chancellor's orthodox approach to the politics of austerity and 
deficit reduction that marginalized environmental considerations. Cameron did little to counter the 
increasingly hostile and vitriolic opposition to wind farms, environmental regulations and green 
levies amongst many Conservative MPs.   
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Thus the environment has arguably not played a significant role in the modernisation project 
since 2010, while it clearly did so before 2010 during the period in opposition. Indeed, if anything, 
the modernising credentials of the Conservative Party have probably been undermined by its 
environmental record in office. Certainly, opinion polling testing Cameron’s ‘greenest government 
ever’ claim and the sincerity of his support for green issues showed generally unfavourable 
evaluations on the part of the wider public (YouGov 2012, 2013, 2014; Opinium 2014). As Dommett 
(2015) observes: ‘Whilst it is easy for politicians to deploy the language of modernisation and offer 
visions of change, delivering these shifts in practice requires significant skill. Not only must a leader 
secure consensus for change within their own party, they must consistently deliver on stated ends if 
they are seen to be successful’ (p.XXX). In office, it became increasingly clear that Cameron had not 
secured an internal consensus on environmental issues, particularly in relation to climate change, 
because of both inter-party and intra-party tensions and fractiousness. The coalition government 
broadly delivered on its green pledges. Yet the environment was a presentational disaster for the 
Conservative Party, due to squabbling with the Liberal Democrats, backbench opposition to wind 
farms and green levies, and the wider context of austerity policies, which prompted Osborne’s 
negative interventions and inconsistent growth-oriented measures, such as huge subsidies for fossil 
fuel exploitation. Cameron's vacillation hardly helped: thus his efforts to quell critics on the 
backbenches by appointing Hayes as Energy  Minister and Paterson as Environment Secretary, were 
later undermined by swiftly moving Hayes elsewhere and later sacking Paterson - an act Paterson 
himself explained as an attempt to appease the 'Green Blob' (Milman 2014).4 Cameron’s despairing 
plea to ‘get rid of all the green crap’ simply cemented the image.  
This unwillingness to pursue the green agenda reflected in part the lower salience of the 
environment and the economic realities of recession and deficit reduction. In addition, in a very 
significant development since 2010, climate change has become a more partisan issue for the 
political right in the UK. Whilst in the USA, Canada and Australia climate change had already become 
a positional issue characterized by sharp, and often fierce, political divisions, in Europe, where 
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climate scepticism is generally lower, several right-wing leaders including Chirac, Sarkozy, Merkel 
and Cameron have in recent years supported strong climate change mitigation targets and policies, 
although subsequently they have all reined in many progressive measures. However, the shift away 
seems to have gone further in the UK where a significant body of Conservative MPs is now 
vehemently opposed to progressive climate policy, as are UKIP and large sections of the right-wing 
press. Perhaps Cameron's (probably unavoidable) mistake was to emphasize climate change as the 
key contemporary environmental challenge that his modernisation project had to embrace, because 
climate change policies - by invoking EU targets, introducing new regulations or imposing green 
taxes - frequently confront some of the most powerful shibboleths of the modern Conservative 
Party. Specifically, opposition to action on climate change has become a key component of the 
populist right wing Eurosceptic discourse. 
We have presented evidence to show that in opposition the environment acted as a valence issue to 
make a positive contribution to Cameron's modernisation project, but since 2010 climate change has 
become a positional issue in British politics, with large sections of the Conservative Party, UKIP and 
their supporters in the wider electorate, holding sceptical views on climate change and opposing 
government action to address it. However, it may still be the case that the natural environment 
remains predominantly a valence issue. After all, most Conservatives also retain a strong concern 
with the natural environment: that is why so many opposed the proposed sell-off of the national 
forests, why many criticize the environmental damage that HS2 will wreak and why there is such 
dislike for wind turbines as 'blots on the landscape' . Interestingly, a recent public opinion survey 
shows that, amongst those intending to vote for the Conservatives, the highest levels of concern for 
climate change are found amongst women and those aged 18-24 (ComRes 2015), which suggests 
that the weakening of the Conservatives’ green credentials may have a detrimental impact on their 
support amongst these groups. Indeed, the announcement by the three major party leaders of a 
pre-election pledge to work together to combat climate change (BBC News, 14 February 2015) 
suggested that Cameron recognized the continuing political importance to the Conservatives of 
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avoiding appearing too far out of step with his rivals on this issue. However, it is doubtful whether 
Cameron could deliver on this commitment in the face of the growing partisan hostility to 
progressive climate policy within his own party.   
 Overall, our findings suggest that the traditional perception of the environment as a valence 
issue needs to be revised. One inference is that the environment has the potential to play a positive 
role in a Conservative modernising agenda only when it operates as a valence issue. 
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1 The BES 2010 in-person survey was obtained from the BES 2009-10 website: http://bes2009-
10.org/bes-data.php. 
2 A search of prime ministerial speeches on Gov.UK revealed a short speech on climate change to the 
2012 Clean Energy Ministerial Summit, and a short address to the UN Climate Summit, 23 September 
2014, and no speech on any wider environmental issues. 
3 The data from the opinion polls presented in Tables 1-3 were obtained by the authors from the 
polling archive section on the YouGov website, available at: 
http://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/. 
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4 Although others pointed to his incompetence in handling the floods during the winter of 2013-14 
as a key factor in his demise (Lean 2014). 
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Figure 1: Issue importance of the environment/pollution, 2005-2013  
 
 
 
 
Source: Ipsos MORI. Data compiled by the authors from: https://www.ipsos-
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=2439&view=wide. 
Note: Percentage for each year based on averaging across monthly data. Monthly data are based on 
combining (unprompted) responses to the following two questions: ‘What would you say is the most 
important issue facing Britain today?’ and ‘What do you see as other important issues facing Britain today?’ 
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Table 1:‘On the subject of climate change do you think:’ 
Per cent saying ‘The world is becoming warmer but not because of human activity’ or ‘The world is not 
becoming warmer’  
 7-11 
March 
2008 
25-26 
October 
2010 
21-22 
June 
2012 
26-27 
March 
2013 
1-2 
April 
2013 
20-21 
June 
2013 
19-20 
September 
2013 
17-18 
February 
2014 
31 March-
1 April 
2014 
Con (%)  41 52 47 47 41 47 44 43 35 
Lab (%) 27 40 31 40 25 29 19 22 24 
Lib Dem (%) 18 33 19 29 18 25 13 28 14 
UKIP (%) - - - 75 59 61 46 59 49 
Source: YouGov. Data compiled by the authors. 
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Table 2: ‘Do you think concerns about climate change have or have not been exaggerated?’ 
Per cent saying ‘have been exaggerated’. 
 19-20 
September 
2013 
17-18 
February 
2014 
31 March-1 
April 
2014 
Con (%)  54 48 43 
Lab (%) 28 24 25 
Lib Dem (%) 20 30 22 
UKIP (%) 62 54 52 
Source: YouGov. Data compiled by the authors. 
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Table 3: Attitudes towards wind power by political party supported 
Per cent saying ‘more than present’ (2011-2012) or ‘The government is right to spend money 
encouraging this form of energy’ (2013) 
 24-25 
November 
2011 
17-18 
May 
2012 
18-19 
October 
2012 
22-23 
November 
2012 
7-8 
February 
2013 
1-2 August 
2013 
24-25 
October 
2013 
Con (%) 43 44 49 38 48 52 42 
Lab (%) 62 61 64 60 64 72 62 
Lib Dem (%) 79 69 67 59 78 79 72 
UKIP (%) - - - - - 51  
Source: YouGov. Data compiled by the authors.  
Questions:  
‘Thinking about the country's future energy provision, do you think the government should be looking to use 
more or less of the following?’ [2011-2012] 
‘Do you think the government is right or wrong to invest money to encourage the development of the 
following forms of energy generation?’ [2013] 
 
 
